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CONFRONTING THE SEXUAL ASSAULT OF
TEENAGE GIRLS: THE MISTAKE OF AGE DEFENCE
IN CANADIAN SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW
Isabel Grant and Janine Benedet*
Teenage girls experience high rates of sexual assault. The Criminal Code
permits the Crown to substitute proof of young age for proof of non-consent
for sexual assault and related offences applicable to young complainants.
This paper focuses on the defence of mistaken belief in age. It provides a
defence where the accused honestly believed that the complainant was at or
above the age of consent and where the accused took all reasonable steps to
ascertain her age. A review of the cases considering the defence indicates that
it is often applied incorrectly, where the accused does not have any belief as
to the complainant's age, or where he has not taken any steps to ascertain her
age beyond a visual observation. These cases are vulnerable to stereotypical
reasoning that girls are "old enough" based on appearance, dress, alcohol
consumption and prior sexual experience. Even in cases where the accused
has little reliable information about the complainant, he may be entitled to
proceed with the information available at the time, rather than being required
to refrain from sexual activity. The paper argues for a reconsideration of how
the defence is applied to bring it more in line with other developments in
sexual assault law.
Les adolescentes sont tr&s nombreuses tre victimes d'agressions sexuelles.
En cas d'agression sexuelle et d'infractions connexes concernant de jeunes
plaignantes, le Code criminel autorise la Couronne remplacer la preuve de
I Professors of Law, Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. This
paper benefited from the diligent research assistance of JD students Hannah Roche and
Allison Sharkey and from funding from the Law Foundation of British Columbia and the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
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l'absence de consentement par celle du jeune dge. Lepr&ent article est ax sur
le moyen de defense de croyance errone quant l'dge, selon lequel l'accus,
d'une part, pensait en toute bonnefoi que la plaignante avait 'age de donner
son consentement et, d'autre part, avait pris toutes les mesures raisonnables
pour s'assurer de son age. Un examen des affaires dans lesquelles le moyen de
dfense a t considr indique qu'il estfr~quemment appliqu incorrectement
lorsque l'accus n'a aucune croyance quant l'age de laplaignante ou lorsqu'il
n'a pris aucune mesure d~passant l'observation visuelle pour v~rifier son age.
Ces affaires sont sujettes au raisonnementfond sur le str otype selon lequel
les filles sont considres comme tant < assez vieilles > sur la base de leur
apparence, de leur habillement, de leur consommation d'alcool et de leur
exprience sexuelle antrieure. M~me dans les affaires oi l'accus posskde tr&s
peu de renseignementsfiables concernant la plaignante, il peut tre autoris
agir sur lafoi de l'information dont il dispose au moment plut6t que d' tre
oblig d'&iter toute activit sexuelle. L'article milite pour un r&xamen
de la fafon dont le moyen de defense est appliqu pour l'amener mieux
correspondre d'autres &olutions du droit en matikre d'agression sexuelle.
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Introduction
While children and adolescents make up approximately 20% of the
Canadian population, they represent roughly 55% of victims of police-
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reported sexual assault.1 Adolescent girls, in particular, are more likely to
report being sexually assaulted than females in any other age range, with
14 being the peak age for victimization. 2 Yet very little legal literature has
addressed the barriers to successful prosecution of these cases. Sexual
assault of adolescent girls takes place in a range of contexts. Many offences
are committed by fathers, stepfathers and other family members. 3 Others
are committed by teenage boyfriends and other peers.4 Still others are
committed by unrelated older men who prey on young girls.5
In this article, we focus on a particular defence to charges of sexual
assault against girls-where the accused asserts that he mistakenly believed
the complainant was at or above the age of consent. 6 The mistake of age
defence operates to negate the mens rea of sexual interference or sexual
assault where the Crown needs to prove the age of the complainant as the
circumstance that makes the sexual touching culpable. For the defence
to operate, the accused must raise a reasonable doubt that he honestly
believed that the complainant was 16 years of age or older, and that he took
all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant. Non-consent
is not an element of these prosecutions; the Crown must prove instead that
the complainant is under the age of 16. Because age is typically much easier
for the Crown to prove than non-consent, the focus of these cases tend to
1 Statistics Canada, Police-Reported Sexual Offences Against Youth and Children by
Adam Cotter & Pascale Beaupre, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa, Statistics Canada, 04
May 2014) [Cotter & Beaupre].
2 Ibid at 10.
3 For a breakdown of familial sexual assault perpetrators see Statistics Canada,
Children and Youth as Victims of Violent Crime by Kathy AuCoin, Catalogue No 85-002-
XIE (Ottawa, Statistics Canada, April 2005) [AuCoin]. Cotter & Beaupr6, supra note 1 at 13
state that, "When the accused was between the ages of 12 and 17 and the victim was under
the age of 12, the accused person was most frequently a family member (59%), such as a
sibling, cousin, or other extended family, while about four in ten (37%) accused persons
were acquaintances'"
4 Cotter & Beaupre, supra note 1 at 11, 13. See also Statistics Canada, Child and
Youth Victims of Police-reported Violent Crime by Lucie Ogrodnik, Catalogue No 85F0033M
(Ottawa, Statistics Canada, March 2010) 3 at 5, 13; AuCoin, supra note 3 at 5.
5 While Cotter & Beaupr6, supra note 1 at 12 13 note that one-third of sexual
offences committed against children or youth are committed by another youth, "[r]oughly
half (510%) of all persons accused of a sexual offence against a child or youth were over the
age of25". The average age of the accused person varies depending on the age of the victim:
Cotter & Beaupre, supra note 1 at 13.
6 Consistent with our previous work, we focus here on girls as victims. Girls make
up 81% of the victims of police reported sexual assaults. In addition, the rate of victimization
for boys is fairly steady from ages 5 16, while for girls it peaks sharply during early to mid-
adolescence. This means that girls make up an even higher percentage of teenage victims:
Cotter & Beaupr6, supra note 1 at 3.
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be on the age of the complainant and whether the accused knew that age,
even though in some cases there is clear evidence that the complainant did
not want the sexual activity to take place.
In 2008, the basic age of consent to sexual activity in Canada was
raised from 14 to 16 years of age, although the age can be as low as 12 and
as high as 18 depending on the age of the accused and the relationship
between the accused and the complainant. 7 The changes responded to
a number of acquittals of much older men who had sexual intercourse
with 14 and 15-year-old teenagers and who were charged with the offence
of sexual exploitation of a young person, which requires proof of a
relationship of trust or authority in addition to proof of age. 8 There was
also concern about cases involving adults of both sexes 9 who groomed
and lured teenagers into sexual activity through online communications. 10
There was controversy about raising the age of consent to 16, despite
the fact that this age is consistent with the threshold used in many other
countries.11 Some critics argued that it was unfair to criminalize sexual
activity between a willing 14 or 15-year-old and an adult without proof
of exploitation. 12 The available evidence makes clear, however, that the
7 Tackling Violent Crime Act, SC 2008, c 6, s 13(1).
8 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 153 [the Code]. See R v Galbraith (1994),
18 OR (3d) 247, 90 CCC (3d) 76 (CA) at 13 14 (no relationship of dependency created
by 27-year-old accused who provided housing to 14-year-old girl); R v GIG, 2002 NBQB
104, 247 NBR (2d) 350 (accused not in position of trust toward 14-year-old girl who was
his daughter's friend and was sleeping over at his home); R v Poncelet, 2008 BCSC 164 at
paras 3, 36, 78 WCB (2d) 435 (40-year-old accused riding coach not in a position of trust
or authority toward 15 -year-old student).
9 R v Horeczy (2006),209 Man R (2d) 311, 72 WCB (2d) 154 (Prov Ct (Crim Div));
R v Hepburn, 2013 ABQB 520, 109 WCB (2d) 323.
10 See R v Legare, 2009 SCC 56, [2009] 3 SCR 551. See also Janice Wolak et al,
"Online Predators: Myth versus Reality" (2013) 25:1 New Eng J Public Policy 1; Georgia
Winters, Leah Kaylor & Elizabeth Jeglic, "Sexual Offenders Contacting Children Online:
An Examination of Transcripts of Sexual Grooming" (2017) 23:1 J Sexual Aggression 62;
Nicola Davis, "Online Grooming of Children Often Alarmingly Fas Researchers Find',
The Guardian (8 September 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/08/
online-grooming-of-children-often-alarmingly-fast-researchers-find>.
11 In the US, the median age of consent is 16, with the age in most states ranging
from 16 18: Joseph J Fischel, "Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent" (2010) 22:2 Yale
JL & Feminism 279 at 300; Janine Benedet, "The Age of Innocence: A Cautious Defense of
Raising the Age of Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law" (2010) 13:4 New Crim L Rev
665 at 672. A 2016 UNICEF report states that "the minimum age of sexual consent in Latin
America and the Caribbean ranges from 12 to 18 years old. The average age is 15 and the
median is 16 years old": Legal Minimum Ages and the Realization of Adolescents'Rights: A
Review of the Situation in Latin America and the Caribbean, UNICEF (2015) 7 at 24.
12 Julie Desrosiers, "Raising the Age of Sexual Consent: Renewing Legal Moralism"
in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women's
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negative consequences of premature exposure to sexual activity with an
adult are significant for many young teenagers. Adolescent girls whose first
sexual activity is with older men have higher rates of suicide, alcohol and
drug use and unwanted pregnancy. 13 In addition, the girls most likely to
engage in this kind of sexual activity are those living in poverty, those who
have been subjected to abuse or neglect and those whose home lives are
chaotic. 14 In other words, early intercourse with adult males is associated
with negative conditions that both precede and flow from that exposure.
For this reason, it is important that the criminal law in this area operate
effectively to respond to such cases.
This article examines the use of the mistake of age defence in Canadian
criminal law. We begin with a consideration of how criminal laws applicable
to the sexual assault of adolescent girls have been influenced by the idea
that while "good" girls need the law's protection, girls who are "bad" may
lead innocent men and boys astray. We explain the evolution of the current
statutory scheme in the Criminal Code ("the Code"), which contains both a
close-in-age exception to age of consent rules as well as the mistake of age
defence. We review the judicial consideration of this defence with a view to
evaluating whether it succeeds in avoiding these stereotypes. We argue that
courts have yet to develop an approach that provides sufficient protection
for girls who are targeted by older men. Instead, the same stereotypes
that have infused consent and mistaken belief in consent determinations
Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 569; Canadian AIDS Society, Age of
Consent: Position Statement (Canada, 2006); EGALE Canada, "EGALE's Submission on
Age of Consent to the Department o fustice Canada (2006), online: Egale Human Rights
Trust <www.egale.ca>.
13 See Harold Leitenberg & Heidi Saltzman, 'A Statewide Survey of Age at First
Intercourse for Adolescent Females and Age of Their Male Partners: Relation to Other
Risk Behaviors and Statutory Rape Implications" (2000) 29:3 Archives Sexual Behavior
203 at 212, "For girls who first had intercourse in very early adolescence (11 12), much
older partners were associated with more suicide attempts, more alcohol and drug abuse,
and a higher incidence of pregnancy"; Irma Elo, Rosalind King & Frank Furstenberg Jr,
"Adolescent Females: Their Sexual Partners and the Fathers of their Children" (1999) 61:1
I Marriage & Family 74 at 81 found that when age differences between partners increase
(referring to first partners), the likelihood that the partner was a steady boyfriend and that
the respondent's first intercourse was voluntary decreases.
14 See e.g. Frank Mott et al, "The Determinants of First Sex by Age 14 in a High-
Risk Adolescent Population" (1996) 28:1 Perspectives on Sexual & Reproductive Health
13; Cathy Spatz Wisdom & Joseph Kuhns, "Childhood Victimization and Subsequent
Risk for Promiscuity, Prostitution, and Teenage Pregnancy: A Prospective Study" (2011)
86:11 American J Public Health 1607; Jamison D Fargo, "Pathways to Adult Sexual
Revictimization: Direct and Indirect Behavioral Risk Factors Across the Lifespan" (2009)
24:11 J Interpersonal Violence 1771; Brent C Miller, Brad Benson & Kevin A Galbraith,
"Family Relationships and Adolescent Pregnancy Risk: A Research Synthesis" (2001) 21:1
Developmental Rev 1.
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for adult women are also evident in determinations about whether the
accused was mistaken about the complainant's age and about the content
of the steps required to ascertain the complainant's age. How a girl dresses,
whether she wears makeup, whether she is out late at night, whether she
consumes alcohol or smokes cigarettes and whether she appears to have
prior sexual experience are all considered relevant to the determination of
whether a man was mistaken about her age and what steps he is required to
take to ascertain her age. In some cases, these stereotypes are so powerful
that the accused is required to do absolutely nothing, beyond observing
the complainant, to meet the requirement that he took all reasonable steps
to ascertain her age. 15
While courts have recognized the dangers of such stereotypes in
sexual assault trials generally, these stereotypes are particularly powerful in
cases involving teenage girls. 16 The result is that cases involving the most
vulnerable girls, who may lack adequate adult support and supervision, or
who may have been inappropriately sexualized at a young age, are the most
difficult to prosecute. We contend that this defence is meant to be a narrow
one. It requires indications that the complainant is 16 years of age or older
that do not rely on such generalizations or stereotypes, and which go
beyond mere evidence that the complainant could have been 16. Further,
we argue that the accused must be required to raise a reasonable doubt
that he was mistaken in his actual belief about the complainant's age, not
that he did not know her age and made an incorrect guess. It appears that
courts assume that, in every case, there are some steps the accused could
have taken that would have justified his mistake and his decision to engage
in sexual activity with the underage complainant. We argue, by contrast,
that some situations present as so uncertain, and so inherently exploitative,
that an accused should be required to refrain from sexual activity where he
cannot reliably verify the age of the complainant.
1. The Teenage Girl as Sexual Temptress
A review of early scholarly criticism of "statutory rape" and "seduction"
offences makes clear that most authors were concerned about the
overreach of these offences and argued in favour of lowering the age of
consent, recognizing a defence of mistake of age, or both. In so doing, they
portray teenage girls as sexual temptresses who unfairly lead good and
normal boys into ruin. In the United States, the 1923 case of State v Snow
was often cited, with its conclusion that:
15 See e.g. R v Tannas, 2015 SKCA 61 at paras 27, 41, 123 WCB (2d) 402 [Tannas].
16 See R v ARD, 2017 ABCA 237, 422 DLR (4th) 47, affid 2018 SCC 6, 422 DLR
(4th) 469.
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[T]his wretched girl was young in years, but old in sin and shame. A number of
callow youths, of otherwise blameless lives ... fell under her seductive influence.
They flocked about her ... like moths about the flame of a lighted candle and
probably with the same result. The girl was a common prostitute ... [t]he boys
were immature and doubtless more sinned against than sinning. They did not
defile the girl. She was a mere "cistern for foul toads to knot and gender in' 1 7
These writings also display a thinly veiled racism and class bias, emphasizing
that girls from particular "communities" may have different standards of
sexual morality.18 The following excerpts are typical:
To be sure, there are many girls between the ages of twelve and fifteen who are
so obviously immature in physique, dress, and deportment that they would
be approached only by a person psychologically disturbed or coming from a
subculture where the acceptable age-range is lower than the usual level in the
United States. However, there are even more girls from twelve to fifteen whose
appearance and behavior place them within, or on the vague border of, the average
male's category of desirable females ... The great majority of these girls, however,
are sexually mature and biologically ready for coitus.
Not only are teen-age girls capable of giving operative consent; the increasing
sexual awareness and promiscuity currently evident at lower ages enhances the
probability that sexual experimentation will be indulged in, and many times
actively solicited by, the girl. "There are sexually promiscuous young girls in
every neighborhood of a city whose favors can be bought by any boy or man for a
pittance, and the amateur counterparts to these young professionals are even more
numerous. 19
These same attitudes were present in Canada as well, where the seduction
offences that were designed to provide some measure of protection to girls
over 15, applied only to victims who were of "previously chaste character".20
In 1920, these offences were narrowed further to provide a defence where
17 State v Snow (1923), 252 SW 629 at 632 (Mo Sup Ct) [Snow].
18 This is evident in the 1964 California Supreme Court decision in People v
Hernandez, 61 Cal 2d 530 at 532, 8 ALR 3d 1092 (Sup Ct), where the court recognizes
a claim of reasonable mistake of age exists in that state. Citing the "moths to the flame"
passage from Snow, supra note 17 with approval, the court points out that: "both learning
from the cultural group to which she is a member and her actual sexual experiences will
determine her level of comprehension'.
19 Larry W Meyers, "Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defence to Statutory
Rape" (1965) 64:1 Mich L Rev 105 at 121 22 [footnotes omitted].
20 The Criminal Code, 1892, 55 56 Victoria c 29, ss 181 82.
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the accused was not "wholly or chiefly to blame."21 It is important to keep
this history of selective protection in mind in evaluating the application of
sexual offences to teenage girls in the present day and to be alert for the
re-emergence of these intersecting stereotypes.
While references in current cases are more subtly expressed, these
attitudes have not been wholly expunged from legal thinking about the
sexuality of teenage girls. For example, in the 2012 trial decision in R v
Barabash, which focused on the private use defence to child pornography,22
the 40 and 60-year-old male accused supplied two 14-year-old homeless
girls with drugs and a place to stay after they had run away from a youth
treatment centre. They then filmed the girls engaging in sexual acts with
one of the accused and each other while high on crack cocaine. In acquitting
the accused, the trial judge described the girls as "sexually experienced"
and "provocative and exhibitionist".23 Rather than recognizing that this
behaviour was likely evidence of the effects of past sexual exploitation by
adults,24 it was used to conclude that they were "in control" of the recording
and its contents.
2. The Legislative Scheme
Prior to 1987, section 146 of the Code provided that sexual intercourse
with a female under 14 years of age who was not the wife of the accused
was a criminal offence subject to a maximum of life imprisonment. 25 It
was no defence if the accused believed that the complainant was 14 or
older because the provision explicitly removed the defence of mistaken
21 Criminal Code, RSC 1927, c 36, s 213(2): "on the trial of any offence against
paragraph (b) of this section, the trial judge may instruct the jury that if in their view the
evidence does not show that the accused is wholly or chiefly to blame for the commission
of said offence, they may find a verdict of acquittal'"
22 This defence, recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Sharpe, 2001
SCC 2, [2001] 1 SCR 45 was designed to apply to young people who made consensual
sexually explicit recordings or photographs for their own private use that would otherwise
meet the definition of child pornography. Since the age of consent was 14 at the time the
recordings were made, the accused tried to argue that they should also be able to rely on
this defence.
23 R v Barabash, 2012 ABQB 99 at paras 94, 92, 532 AR 364 [Barabash]. This
decision was overturned by a 2:1 majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta (R v Barabash,
2014 ABCA 126,572 AR 289) and a further appeal as of right to the Supreme Court resulted
in an order for a new trial: R vBarabash, 2015 SCC 29, [2015] 2 SCR 522.
24 For example, there was evidence that one of the girls had been in prostitution
since age 12 and that one of the accused had acted as her pimp: Barabash, supra note 23 at
para 32.
25 Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, s 146(1).
[Vol. 97
2019] Confronting the Sexual Assault of Teenage Girls: The Mistake... 9
belief.26 In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Hess; R v Nguyen 27
held that section 146 violated section 7 of the Charter28 because there was
no due diligence defence available to the accused with respect to mistaken
belief in age. In other words, an accused who reasonably believed that the
complainant was 14 or older would still be convicted. A majority of the
Court held that the section could not be upheld as a reasonable limit under
section 1 of the Charter.29
By the time of the decision in Hess, section 146 had already been
repealed, and new offences had been introduced that included sexual
interference (section 151), invitation to sexual touching (section 152)
and sexual exploitation (section 153). All of these offences were made
gender-neutral so that they could be committed by and against persons of
either sex. These offences expanded the scope of behaviours by adults that
would be considered criminal beyond sexual intercourse to include sexual
touching and enticements toward sexual touching30 and created a separate
provision for people in positions of authority over a young person.31
Section 150.1 was added along with these amendments; it provides
that the consent of a minor is not a defence and sets out exceptions where
the accused was close in age to the complainant. Section 150.1(4) provides
that a mistaken belief on the part of the accused that the complainant was
at or over the age of consent will only be a defence if the accused has taken
all reasonable steps to ascertain her age.
While there was very little discussion of the choice of language for
the "all reasonable steps" provision in the Parliamentary debates, then
Minister of Justice Ray Hnatyshyn did speak about the new offences
to protect children: "[w]ith the three new offences, and in fact all the
provisions that would protect children, mistake of age will not be a defence
26 Ibid.
27 Rv Hess, [1990] 2 SCR906 at 10, 31, 11 WCB (2d) 199 [Hess].
28 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11 [Charter].
29 Hess, supra note 27 at 31.
30 Offences were also added in 1993 for possessing, making and distributing child
pornography (s 163.1) and in 2002 for luring a young person by means of a computer
system. (s 172.1). With regard to luring by means of a computer system, see e.g. R v Hajar,
2016 ABCA 222, WCB (2d) 523 [Hajar] and R v Morrison, 2017 ONCA 582, 136 OR (3d)
545, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 2017 CarswellOnt 19979.
31 The Code, supra note 8, s 153(1.2).
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unless the accused took every reasonable step to ascertain the age of the
complainant" 32
The mistaken belief in age defence for complainants under 16 is
analogous to the argument, for complainants over 16, that the accused was
unaware that the complainant was not consenting to the sexual activity in
question. In both contexts, the mens rea defence based on the accused's
lack of knowledge arises when the actus reus component of non-consent
(for adult women) or young age (for those under the age of consent)
has been established beyond a reasonable doubt by the Crown. In both
contexts, Parliament has chosen to limit the scope of the mens rea defence
available to an accused. A mistaken belief in and of itself is insufficient;
steps must have been taken by the accused to apprise himself of the true
circumstances. While there are similarities between these defences, there
are also significant differences that are often overlooked in the case law.
Section 150.1(4) reads as follows:
(4) It is not a defence to a charge under section 151 or 152, subsection 160(3) or
173(2), or section 271, 272 or 273 that the accused believed that the complainant
was 16 years of age or more at the time the offence is alleged to have been
committed unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the
complainant.
3 3
Section 150.1(4) is a limiting provision, not one that creates a broad defence
of mistake. Common law rules regarding mens rea would allow an accused
to raise a mistaken belief in age to negate the mens rea for the offence no
matter how unreasonable that mistake was. Section 150.1(4) was meant to
limit the circumstances in which a mistaken belief defence could operate.
A mistake is no defence if it was based on taking no or even some steps to
ascertain the complainant's age; only a mistake founded on having taken
all reasonable steps provides a defence.
The mistaken belief in consent defence in section 273.2 of the Code,
by contrast, provides that an accused cannot raise the defence of honest
mistaken belief in consent for an adult complainant where he did not
"take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the
time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting."34 This provision
was originally drafted so as to require all reasonable steps, but this was
32 "Bill C-15, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act
2nd Reading, House of Commons Debates, 33-2, No 1 (4 November 1986) at 1038 (Hon Ray
Hnatyshyn).
33 The Code, supra note 8, s 150.1(4).
34 Ibid, s 273(2).
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revised prior to third reading because there were some concerns that "all
reasonable steps" might not be Charter compliant.35
The second obvious difference between these defences is that
the mistaken belief in consent defence requires only that the steps be
reasonable "in the circumstances known to the accused at the time."36
There is no such qualifier in the mistake of age defence. However, courts
rarely recognize this second difference and tend to treat section 150.1(4) as
if it was worded identically to section 273.2. 37
Canadian criminal law recognizes that a teenager's capacity to give
consent may vary depending on the age of the person with whom the young
person is engaging in sexual activity and the potential for exploitation.
While in most cases the age of consent is set at 16, the relevant age is 18
in cases involving pornography and sentencing for prostitution-related
offences, 38 in recognition of the particularly exploitative nature of these
acts. In addition, the age of consent is set at 18 where the accused is in a
position of trust or authority over the complainant, or in a relationship
of dependency or exploitation. There are also specific rules referred to as
"close in age exceptions" for which proof of consent provides an affirmative
defence if the accused is close in age to the complainant. These can apply
to complainants as young as 12. For 12 and 13-year-old complainants, the
accused may invoke a close in age exception if he is less than two years
older than the complainant while for 14 and 15-year-old complainants, the
accused must be less than five years older in order to rely on the close in
age exception. 39 These close in age exceptions do not apply if the accused
35 "Bill C-49, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault)'" 3rd Reading,
House of Commons Debates, 34-3, No 9 (15 June 1992) at 12046 (Hon Shirley Maheu).
36 The Code, supra note 8, s 273(2).
37 Seee.g. RvE, 2011NUCJ35,98WCB(2d) 779[RvE].
38 It is now illegal to purchase or offer to purchase sexual services from a person of
any age, with the penalties higher where the person bought is under 18: See s 286.1 of the
Code, supra note 8.
39 Sections 150.1(2) and 150.1(2.1) of the Code read as follows:
(2) When an accused is charged with an offence under section 151 or 152,
subsection 173(2) or section 271 in respect of a complainant who is 12 years of
age or more but under the age of 14 years, it is a defence that the complainant
consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge if the
accused
(a) is less than two years older than the complainant; and
(b) is not in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, is not
a person with whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency
and is not in a relationship with the complainant that is exploitative of the
complainant.
(2.1) If an accused is charged with an offence under section 151 or 152,
subsection 173(2) or section271 in respect ofa complainant who is 14 years of age
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has exploited a position of trust or authority or if the complainant is in a
relationship of dependency in relation to the accused. Where the accused
fits within one of these exceptions, "consent" to sexual activity will be a
defence. These provisions recognize that, while a young person may be
capable of consenting to sexual activity with someone close in age, they are
incapable of consent where the accused is significantly older. A 15-year-
old girl, for example, may be legally capable of consenting to sex with an
18-year-old but not capable of consenting to sex with a 35-year-old. This
recognizes that as the age disparity increases, the imbalance of power and
the potential for harm increase. 40
The close in age exceptions reflect a recognition that younger
teenagers do engage in sexual experimentation with each other and that
the criminal law is not the appropriate tool for protecting teenagers from
the consequences of all such activity. However, where men are outside of
the close in age exceptions, there should be a significant responsibility on
them to make sure that the girls with whom they are engaging in sexual
activity are 16 years of age or older.
The allocation of the burden of proof when dealing with sexual assault
is particularly important because credibility is such an important variable.
Where the close in age exceptions apply, consent is described as a "defence;
suggesting that the onus is on the accused either to prove it on a balance of
probabilities or to at least satisfy the air of reality threshold. There are few
cases in which the close in age exception is even potentially applicable and
so there has not been much judicial consideration of this question. The
few cases that have considered the question of proof are divided as to who
has the burden of proof for the close in age exceptions.41 By comparison,
or more but under the age of 16 years, it is a defence that the complainant
consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge if the
accused
(a) is less than five years older than the complainant; and
(b) is not in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, is not
a person with whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency
and is not in a relationship with the complainant that is exploitative of the
complainant.
The close in age exceptions survived a Charter challenge on the basis of overbreadth in R v
B(A), 2015 ONCA 803,25 CR (7th) 52.
40 Section 153 of the Code creates the crime of sexual exploitation and s 153(1.2)
explicitly allows the trier of fact to draw an inference of exploitation from circumstances,
including the age of complainant and the age disparity between the parties.
41 See R v Thompson (1992), 131 AR 317, 76 CCC (3d) 142 (CA) [Thompson],
which states that the burden is on the accused to prove the consent defence provided. In
Thompson at para 6, the Court states that, "[t]he worth of the submission obviously hinges
on where the burden of proof that the defence exception provided in ss. 150.1(2) (a) and (b)
rests. I think it is clear that it does not rest upon the Crown.' However, in R v S(W), 2015
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despite the high threshold created by section 150.1(4), the mistake of age
defence in Canada has been consistently interpreted as requiring only
that the accused raise an air of reality that he was mistaken and that he
took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age in order for the
defence to go to the jury. 42 There is no persuasive burden on the accused
to prove that he was mistaken about the complainant's age or that he took
all reasonable steps to ascertain it.43
It is not sufficient, however, if the accused raises an air of reality that
he took some reasonable steps; rather the evidentiary burden must relate
to all reasonable steps having been taken. Once the accused raises an air
of reality, the Crown is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused did not take all reasonable steps. This will often, although
ONCJ 744, 127 WCB (2d) 326 the Court at para 5 states that, "the Crown offered helpful
submissions in framing the debate by suggesting that there are two ways to view section
150(1). First, s 150.1 can be seen as an exception available to the accused to put the issue of
consent into issue, as a defence. On this view, s 150.1 would impose a burden of proof on
the accused relating to "consent' Alternatively, s 150(1) can be understood to be a provision
that, for some offences in some circumstances, adds consent to the elements of the offence
the Crown must prove. Specifically, where the accused shows that the circumstances set
out in sub-sections 150.1(2) (2.2) apply, to succeed in prosecuting s 151, 153 or 173(2)
offences, the Crown must also prove that the complainant did not consent"
42 Although there has been some uncertainty as to whether the air of reality
threshold applies to the reasonable steps component of the defence, in a recent decision
on mistaken belief in consent in the military context, the Court Martial Appeals court
held that the air of reality threshold applies to both the mistaken belief in consent and
reasonable steps. R c Gagnon, 2018 CMAC 1 at para 5, 146 WCB (2d) 103, aff d 2018 SCC
41 [Gagnon]; See also R vBarton, 2017 ABCA 216 at paras 296 99, 140 WCB (2d) 605, leave
to appeal granted, 2018 CarswellAlta 444, (March 8, 2018) [Barton]. The Supreme Court
of Canada in Gagnon upheld the decision of the Court Martial Appeals Court from the
bench without discussing this issue. The appeal in Barton has been heard and the decision
is under consideration. This approach differs from the approach taken by the majority of
the Supreme Court in R v Esau, [ 1997] 2 SCR 777, 148 DLR (4th) 662, which can be read as
holding that reasonable steps to ascertain consent are not part of the air of reality threshold
for leaving the defence with the jury.
43 R v Westman, [1995] BCJ No 2124, 28 WCB (2d) 440 (CA) at para 20; R v
Osborne (1992), 102 Nfld & PEIR 194, 17 WCB (2d) 581 (CA) at 17 18 [Osborne]. It was
not inevitable that the burden of proof be placed on the Crown. In Tasmania, for example,
the accused must prove on a balance of probabilities that he had an honest belief that the
complainant was of the age of majority, which in Tasmania is 17 (Criminal Code Act 1924
(Tas), s 124(1)). In Canada, because of the jurisprudence under ss 7 and 11 (d), putting the
burden of proof on the accused, even for a defence, can only be justified if it is a reasonable
limit under s 1 of the Charter (R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200; R v Chaulk,
[1990] 3 SCR 1303, 69 Man R (2d) 161).
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not always, require as a practical matter that the accused testify as to his
mistake.44
One issue that remains undecided is whether the accused can raise
a defence of mistake based not on his belief that the complainant was 16
years of age or older, but rather a mistaken belief that her age brought him
within the close in age exceptions. For example, this could be a 17-year-old
accused who wants to argue that he honestly believed that the complainant
was 15 when she was in fact 12. The Code is not clearly drafted on this
point but section 150.1(6) seems to indicate that such a defence can be
raised, stating "An accused cannot raise a mistaken belief in the age of the
complainant in order to invoke a defence under subsection (2) or (2.1)
[the close in age exceptions] unless the accused took all reasonable steps
to ascertain the age of the complainant."45 Some courts have allowed the
defence while others have rejected it.
In R v O(D), the Court acquitted the accused on the basis of a reasonable
doubt that the 18-year-old accused honestly believed the complainant was
15 which would have brought the 12-year-old complainant within the
close in age exception. 46 The Court went on to apply the all reasonable
steps requirement and found that the accused's observations were not
inconsistent with the complainant's Facebook profile, which said that she
was almost 16 and thus allowed the defence. 47 In R v UHC,48 the Nova
Scotia Provincial Court preferred the argument that no such defence
existed for the following reasons:
I believe that the purpose of section 150.1 is to limit strictly the resort to mistaken
belief in age in the following manner. First, sub-s. 150.1(6) makes clear that sub-ss.
150.1(2) and (2.1) may be invoked only as a part of a defence of mistake of age, so
that mistake will be inadmissible unless the actual close-in-age criteria of sub-ss.
150(2) and (2.1) are met; furthermore, sub-s. 150.1(4) makes clear that the only
mistake that will be admissible in any case is a belief that the complainant was at
least 16 years of age. Accordingly, for a 16 year old accused to come into court and
admit to sexual activity with a 12 year old, but seek to excuse it by asserting a belief
that the complainant was 14 would amount to a mistake of law.
4 9
44 R v Slater, 2005 SKCA 87 at para 26,269 Sask R 42 [Slater]; the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal has overturned a conviction and ordered a new trial on the basis that defence
counsel failed to advise the accused at the risks of not testifying: R v Ross, 2012 NSCA 56 at
paras 58, 61 62, 317 NSR (2d) 243.
45 The Code, supra note 8 at 150.1(6).
46 R v 0 (D), 2017 ONSC 2027, 138 WCB (2d) 407.
47 Ibid at paras 18, 20.
48 R v UHC, 2015 NSPC 10 at paras 14 15,119 WCB (2d) 651.
49 Ibid at para 14.
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Despite this interpretation the Court applied the defence, relying on
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in R v Ross, even though that
case did not clearly decide this issue.50 More recently in R v JM, the
Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court rejected this defence stating
that, "Parliament has drawn a bright line that makes it illegal for an accused
to engage in sexual activity with a complainant who is five years or more
younger than him or her."51
A mistaken belief that the complainant is within the close in age
exceptions can only be raised by accused who are themselves adolescents
or young adults, not the much older men that we saw in many of the
cases. However, the complainant in such cases will necessarily be a young
adolescent or even a child. The accused is essentially arguing a defence (a
mistaken belief in age) that entitles him to another defence through the
close in age exception, namely that the complainant actually consented.
It is very important that the courts not treat a reasonable doubt as to the
complainant being within the close in age exception as ending the inquiry.
Courts must give real meaning to the "all reasonable steps" requirement
and also be satisfied that this is not a case of actual non-consent.
3. Judicial Interpretation of the Mistaken Belief
in Age Defence
It is important to preface our examination of the case law with what may
seem like an obvious observation. In every one of the cases discussed in
this section, the accused is acknowledging that he was mistaken about
the complainant's age. Thus, in every one of these cases, the accused is
conceding that whatever steps he took to ascertain her age were inadequate
to do just that. This fact is rarely acknowledged by judges and should, in
our view, lead to the conclusion that the all reasonable steps requirement
should be applied narrowly and that only in exceptional cases should an
accused be acquitted notwithstanding having taken steps that were factually
inadequate. Yet many courts fail to give real weight to this requirement.
The other fact that should be noted at the outset is that the majority
of these cases do not involve young men just outside the close in age
50 R v Ross, 2012 NSCA 56 at para 13, 317 NSR (2d) 243.
51 R v JM, 2017 NLTD(G) 110 at para 61, 139 WCB (2d) 250. The 1984 Badgley
Report that led to the modernization of sexual offences against youth was against the idea
of close in age exceptions altogether noting that the close in age exceptions could influence
prosecutors in charging decisions in difficult cases where the accused was within the close
in age exceptions even where the complainant had claimed that she did not agree to the
sexual activity. See Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths, Sexual
Offences Against Children in Canada: Report of the Committee on Sexual Offences Against
Children and Youths (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984).
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exceptions. Rather, many of these cases involve much older men,
sometimes in their 30s and 40s, having sex with girls as young as 12. Men
often target young girls deliberately on the Internet, sometimes making
child pornography out of that sexual activity,52 and sometimes grooming
the girls over a considerable period of time. 53 In a significant number of
cases, these girls live in troubled family situations or group homes54 and
thus are particularly vulnerable to sexual predators. While only a few cases
mention whether the complainant is Indigenous, we know that Indigenous
children are vastly overrepresented among children in state care and thus
are likely to bear the brunt of this reality.55
In a larger study we are conducting on sexual assault against adolescent
girls from ages 12-17 over a three-year time frame, we found 26 cases
where the accused was asserting a mistaken belief and that he had taken
all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age. For the 21 cases for
which the age of both parties was given, the average age difference between
the complainant and the accused was just over 13 years. This disparity is
particularly significant given that we are talking about girls who are 12 to
15 years of age, as it means in some cases the accused is more than twice as
old as the complainant.
In the following section, we demonstrate a number of concerns about
the approach taken by the courts and why those concerns render cases
involving the most vulnerable complainants the most difficult to prosecute.
A) Incapacity to Consent as a Mere Formality
Many courts see the rule that a child under 16 cannot consent as a formal
requirement and not a substantive one. The old language of "statutory
rape" suggested that these cases were not real rape, but rather labelled
rape as a technicality. The same reasoning is seen in some of the mistaken
belief cases. In many cases, judges still make reference to the fact that
52 See e.g. R v Harden, 2016 SKQB 32,128 WCB (2d) 404 [Harden]; R v Sims, 2006
BCSC 651, 70 WCB (2d) 454.
53 In Harden, supra note 52 the accused church leader in his late 30s groomed a
young girl who was having difficulties with her adoptive family over a number of years; R v
Mastel, 2011 SKCA 16, 366 SaskR 193 [Mastel].
54 See e.g. R v Cummer, 2014 MBQB 62,304 Man R (2d) 152 [Cummer]; R vArook,
2016 ABQB 528, 133 WCB (2d) 190; R v Campbell (1995), 28 WCB (2d) 111, 100 WAC 236
(BC CA).
55 Sandrina de Finney, "Playing Indian and Other Settler Stories: Disrupting
Western Narratives of Indigenous Girlhood" (2015) 29:2 J Media & Cultural Studies 169
at 170 [de Finney, "Narratives of Indigenous Girlhood"]. See also Statistics Canada, Study:
Living Arrangements of Aboriginal Children Aged 14 and Under, 2011, Catalogue No 11-
001-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 13 April 2016).
[Vol. 97
2019] Confronting the Sexual Assault of Teenage Girls: The Mistake... 17
the underage complainant consented, without acknowledging that girls
under 16 cannot give consent where there is a sufficient difference in age
between the two parties. In R v Nguyen, for example, the Court of Appeal
for Saskatchewan introduced the facts by saying that the 13-year-old
complainant "had consensual sex" with the 32-year-old accused, who was
the best friend of her stepfather.56
Some judges talk about the difference between defacto consent, which
a child is able to give, and de jure consent, which she is not.57 The Code
unfortunately uses language that could be seen to support this analysis
when it says that "it is not a defence that the complainant consented to the
activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge."58 While this may seem
to be just a question of semantics, how this sexual encounter is portrayed
shapes the courts' perception of the events in question. In declaring the
presence of consent, the complainant becomes an equal participant, not
a child who was too young to understand the exploitative nature of sex
with a much older adult.59 It seems to us that some judges are erroneously
equating consent with a failure to object and defining non-consent in
this context in terms of violence by the accused and resistance by the
complainant. This overlooks the fact that, in most cases, the accused does
not need to use violence because he is able to exploit the complainant's
youth.
In a sentencing decision dealing with the offence of sexual interference,
a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal of Alberta has underlined that a
girl under 16 is not capable of giving consent, and that it is inappropriate
to speak of the sexual activity in such terms. In R v Hajar,60 the Court
56 R v Nguyen, 2017 SKCA 30 at paras 4, 7, 138 WCB (2d) 509 [Nguyen]. See also
Osborne, supra note 43 at para 62 where the Court describes the law criminalizing sex with
someone under age "notwithstanding that the encounter may be consensual".
57 See Tannas, supra note 15 at para 20; Nguyen, supra note 56 at para 4.
58 The Code, supra note 8, s 150.1(1).
59 See e.g. Tannas, supra note 15 at para 23 where the Court states that, "[w]hat
this means is that if a defendant's honestly-held but mistaken belief as to a consenting
complainant's age is objectively reasonable on the evidence before the court (i.e., because
the defendant has taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age), then the
defendant's mistake as to the complainant's age effectively negates the mens rea element of
the offence' See also R v Clarke, 2016 SKCA 80 at para 2, 480 Sask R 277 where the appellate
Court states that, "The trial judge found that the complainant had consented in fact to
sexual intercourse and he had a reasonable doubt about whether Mr. Clarke knew she was
under the age of 16 years"; Cummer, supra note 54 at para 48 finds that "the complainant
did initially consent"; R v Hubert, 2016 BCPC 288 at para 11, 133 WCB (2d) 391 states that,
"I am satisfied that Mr. Hubert might have had an honest but mistaken belief that B.B. and
O.B. were consenting'"
60 Hajar, supra note 30 at paras 88 90.
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acknowledged that using "de facto consent" as a mitigating factor in
sentencing fails to recognize that children under 16 are not capable of
giving true consent to sexual activity:
In raising the age of consent, Parliament determined that children in the protected
category are incapable of consenting to sexual activity with older persons outside
the close in age exceptions. That is because of the power imbalance inherent in
the relationships between children and those older persons coupled with the
particular vulnerability of children. Put simply, children in the protected category
are not capable of making such an important, personal and potentially life-altering
decision.
Why is this so? Children have limited experience and psychological resources and
a very limited comprehension of the psycho- social aspects of sex. Add to this that
adults have enhanced power and standing in the eyes of children and are seen
as authority figures by virtue of age. And it is understandable why, as a result,
it is very difficult for a child to assert herself or himself against an adult ... In
addition, in many circumstances where the child is female and the adult male,
there will be the added element of gender [in] equality. Also relevant, and perhaps
less obvious, is the role played by fear, confusion, coercion and desire for affection
and attention. At their developmental stage, children in the protected category
may be emotionally needy and easily confuse sexual predation for affection and
attention. On top of this, the general trend in this type of relationship is for an adult
to gradually convince a child to accede to the sexual relationship because the child
falsely perceives that he or she has consented to it.
6 1
The Court acknowledged that the concept of defacto consent is not actual
consent and that the concept "suffers from all the misconceptions as to
what is meant by 'consent' that predated the Supreme Court decision in
R v Ewanchuk."62
When courts fall into the trap of talking about consensual sex between
an adult and a child under 16, they distort the very nature of the sexual
encounter in question and make it more likely that the steps taken by the
accused will be seen to be reasonable. Children are portrayed as sexual
aggressors, equally responsible for the ensuing sexual activity. For example,
in R v E,63 the Court describes the 12-year-old complainant as having
"repeatedly pursued the accused as the target of her sexual interest."64
61 Ibid [footnotes omitted, emphasis added].
62 Hajar, supra note 30 at para 86.
63 R v E, supra note 37.
64 Ibid at para 93.
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We agree with the reasoning in Hajar and hope that it is adopted in
other jurisdictions. The fact that a child is pursuing sexual contact with an
adult means that it is likely that the child has already been inappropriately
sexualized by one or more adults in the past.65 It is the responsibility of the
adult to decline sexual contact with the young person, regardless of how it
was initiated.
B) Evidence of Non-Consent not Considered
In many of these cases, there was evidence of non-consent which would have
made the sexual activity criminal regardless of the age of the complainant.
However, evidence of the complainant's non-consent tends to disappear in
cases where the accused alleges he was mistaken about the complainant's
age. The very fact that the accused raises the mistake of age defence shifts
the focus away from the complainant's expression of non-consent to the
age of the complainant and the accused's knowledge thereof. In a number
of the cases we reviewed, the complainant contacted police not because
she came to realize that the accused had taken advantage of her youth, but
because she claimed that the accused imposed himself sexually on her in a
way that she did not want at the time it took place.66
At first glance, it may seem contradictory for us to speak of the
complainant's lack of consent when we are claiming that her youth makes
her incapable of consent. However, as we have argued elsewhere, in the
context of complainants with mental disabilities, there is a difference
between the capacity to give voluntary agreement to sexual activity and
the capacity to know that you do not want to be touched sexually by the
accused.67 We contend that the capacity to say yes to sexual activity requires
a more advanced state of development or understanding than the capacity
to say no which simply requires that the complainant know that she does
not want to be touched sexually. A 14-year-old girl, who is incapable of
65 Evidence of sexually inappropriate behaviour is used as a diagnostic indicator of
child sexual abuse: see e.g. Jon McClellan et al, "Age of Onset of Sexual Abuse: Relationship
to Sexually Inappropriate Behaviours" (1996) 35:10 J Am Academy Child & Adolescent
Psychiatry 1375; Kathleen A Kendall-Tackett, Linda Meyer Williams & David Finkelhor,
"The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical
Studies" (1993) 113:1 Psychology Bull 164.
66 See e.g. R v Holloway, 2013 ONCA 374,107 WCB (2d) 313 [Holloway]; R v MC,
2011 NLTD(G) 93,95 WCB (2d) 541 [MC]; R vLTP (1997), 33 WCB (2d) 292, 142 WAC
20 (BC CA) [LTP].
67 Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, "A Situational Approach to Incapacity and Mental
Disability in Sexual Assault Law" (2013) 43:1 Ottawa L Rev 1 at 20. See also Isabel Grant
& Janine Benedet, "Capacity to Consent and Intoxicated Complainants in Sexual Assault
Prosecutions" (2017), 37 CR (7th) 375.
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giving voluntary agreement to sexual activity with a 30-year-old man, may
be quite capable of knowing that she does not want to have sex with him.
In those cases where courts consider non-consent, they do not
recognize this distinction.68 In R v Holloway,69 for example, the trial
judge acquitted the accused on the basis of mistaken belief in age after she
concluded that the sexual activity was not "forced' a misunderstanding of
the legal meaning of non-consent. This was notwithstanding the fact that
both sides agreed that the complainant:
[I]nitially expressly refused to engage in the sexual activity sought by the
respondent when she arrived at his home. It was common ground that they argued
and the argument became somewhat vociferous. It was common ground that at
some point after the complainant had been in the respondent's home for four or
five hours she fled the home. It was common ground that she had some significant
physical injuries when she left the home.7 0
In R v MC, the complainant testified that the accused sexually assaulted
her in a hot tub.71 Instead, the trial judge characterized her as "complicit"
in the sexual activity, a term which suggests that the complainant is to
blame for the violence perpetrated against her.72 There is no legal concept
of complicity in Canadian sexual assault law.
If a girl has lied about her age to the accused or others, it may have an
impact on her credibility when she asserts that the sexual activity was non-
consensual. In R v Beckford,73 for example, the complainant had lied about
her age to the accused, the police and to potential pimps when she was
entering prostitution. As a result of this, the trial judge said her evidence
on non-consent was not sufficiently reliable to accept.
On balance, we think it is more faithful to the complainant's
understanding of the harm done to her to deal with the issue of whether
the complainant did not want to participate in the sexual activity first, but
only if the court is able to recognize that the failure to prove non-consent
does not mean that she consented to the sexual activity or that she is a liar.
It is simply a failure of proof by the Crown to the high standard of beyond
68 For an example of the recognition of this distinction by American courts in the
context of an adult complainant with a mental disability, see People v Thompson (2006), 142
Cal App (4th) 1426.
69 Holloway, supra note 66 at para 14.
7o Ibid at para 13.
71 MC, supra note 66 at paras 10 13.
72 Ibid at para 55.
73 R v Beckford, 2016 ONSC 1066, 128 WCB (2d) 298 at para 31.
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a reasonable doubt. Nor should this conclusion be used to reduce what
steps the accused is required to take to support a mistaken belief in age.
We recognize that encouraging courts to consider non-consent before
considering mistake of age can be fraught for complainants. If the claim
does not succeed, the complainant's overall credibility may be damaged
because she was not believed on this issue. It may also lead the court to
the erroneous conclusion that the complainant actually consented even
though she is legally incapable of consent. But failing to consider the
allegation of non-consent, and turning immediately to the question of age,
ignores the gravamen of the complaint in many of these cases and fails to
consider coercive actions by the accused.
C) Was the Accused Actually Mistaken?
There are two inquiries mandated by section 150.1(4): first, did the accused
actually believe (mistakenly) that the complainant was 16 or older? Second,
did he take all reasonable steps to ascertain her age? The focus in the cases
tends to be on the latter inquiry at the expense of examining the accused's
actual belief. Some courts appear to overlook that section 150.1(4) requires
that an accused actually believe that the complainant was 16 or older. It
does not create a defence where the accused simply does not know or
care how old the complainant is. If the accused believes the complainant
is "around 17"74 then the accused does not have an honest belief in the
complainant's age. Estimating or guessing a complainant's age is different
than mistakenly believing the complainant is 16 or older.
Lucinda Vandervort, in her article about juvenile prostitution, points
out that where the accused is relying on the complainant's appearance or
her unconfirmed representations about her age, he will almost always not
actually know how old the complainant is.75 We understand Vandervort
to be using the word "know" in this context to mean an actual good faith
belief that the complainant is a particular age, as opposed to an assumption
or a belief that the complainant might be "old enough" An accused who
simply makes an assumption based on these factors should be convicted
on the basis of willful blindness or recklessness. 76 Confusing assumptions
74 R v George, 2017 SCC 38 at para 6, [2017] 1 SCR 1021[George]. For a recent
example, see R v CJC, 2018 NLCA 68 where the trial judge found that the 36-year-old
accused believed the complainant was "at least 16" (para 37") or "16 or 17" (para 49).
75 Lucinda Vandervort, "'Too Young to Sell Me Sex!?' Mens Rea, Mistake of Fact,
Reckless Exploitation, and the Underage Sex Worker" (2012) 58:3 Crim LQ 355 at 360 61.
76 The line between recklessness and wilful blindness is sometimes a confusing one
in criminal law. In R v Sansregret, [1985] 1 SCR 570 at 584, 35 Man R (2d) l[footnotes
omitted], the Supreme Court of Canada describes the difference between wilful blindness
and recklessness:
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or guesses with belief results in the defence being given a much broader
scope than simply applying it to those who believed the complainant was
of age. It is being applied where the trier of fact has a reasonable doubt that
the accused thought the complainant was probably about 16 or older, even
though in fact the accused did not have a belief as to how old she was and
knew that she might be under 16. In one case, the trial judge allowed the
defence because there was evidence that could support a belief that the
complainant was 16 even though there was no evidence that the accused
himself held this belief. 77
A pro forma question meant only to satisfy the legal standard should
also not be sufficient. For example, in R v Slater, the accused had asked a
16-year-old girl how old she was before he paid her for sex. She responded
that she was "over 18" which clearly was directed to the legal standard
involved. The trial judge correctly found that that was not an earnest
inquiry and that more questioning was necessary. 78
In R v George, the 35-year-old female accused did not know how old
the 14-year-old male complainant was and took no steps to inquire until a
few months later when she applied to be an RCMP officer and was asked
whether she had ever had sex with someone under 16. At that time, she
went back and asked her son about the complainant's age. George's acquittal
at trial was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, yet it is unclear that
George ever held any belief in the complainant's age. 79
Wilful blindness is distinct from recklessness because, while recklessness
involves knowledge of a danger or risk and persistence in a course of conduct
which creates a risk that the prohibited result will occur, wilful blindness arises
where a person who has become aware of the need for some inquiry declines to
make the inquiry because he does not wish to know the truth. He would prefer
to remain ignorant. The culpability in recklessness is justified by consciousness
of the risk and by proceeding in the face of it, while in wilful blindness it is
justified by the accused's fault in deliberately failing to inquire when he knows
there is reason for inquiry.
77 See e.g. R vMoise, 2016 SKCA 133 atpara 31,134 WCB (2d) 306where the Court
of Appeal found that the fact that there was evidence that could support a mistaken belief
"shed no light on whether he had the requisite belief and did not allow even an inference to
be drawn that Mr. Moise believed [the complainant] to be 16 years of age. The trial judge
engaged in conjecture or speculation that these factors could have created Mr. Moise's belief
regarding [the complainant's] age.' The trial judge had concluded since there was a basis for
a reasonable mistake that there was no reason to make inquiries. The Court of Appeal also
found this to be an error and held that the trial judge never should have gotten to the all
reasonable steps requirement because there was no evidence that the accused was actually
mistaken.
78 Slater, supra note 44.
79 R v George, 2016 SKCA 155, 135 WCB (2d) 536 [George 2016], revd George,
supra note 74.
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The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan, which had overturned the
acquittal, had stated as follows: "[a] s for the first issue, honest belief, the
trial judge concluded that Ms. George had no knowledge of C.D's actual
age at the time of the sexual encounter. He found as a fact that she honestly
believed C.D. to have been at least 16 years of age" 80 An accused who has no
belief in the complainant's actual age does not have a mistaken belief. The
trial judge noted the complainant's physical appearance, his association
with older boys, the fact that he smoked, his cocky and callous attitude with
respect to the sexual encounter and his familiarity with sexual activity.81
None of these factors gave the accused any information about how old the
complainant actually was but rather just shaped her assumptions, to the
extent she thought about it all. The fact that when she was asked a question
on a job application about whether she had had sex with an underage boy
she thought back to the complainant reveals at the very least that she had a
suspicion that the complainant was under age, which should have at least
raised the possibility of wilful blindness, which equates deliberately closing
your mind to the facts with actual knowledge. 82
Sometimes the inquiries as to the accused's mistaken belief and the
steps he took to ascertain age are merged such that the evidence supporting
reasonable steps is used to establish that the accused was actually mistaken.
In these cases, the fact that there was some evidence that the accused could
have believed that the complainant was above the age of consent is used to
establish that the accused actually did make such a mistake. In Slater, for
example, the accused did not testify, nor did he present any evidence. 83 Yet
all of the appellate court's focus was on what steps he had taken to ascertain
the complainants' ages. There was no analysis about whether the accused
was actually mistaken as to the complainants' ages when he offered them
money for sex.
D) Doing Nothing Can Satisfy "ALL Reasonable Steps"
One of the most problematic features of the case law on the mistake of
age defence is that the mistake of age defence succeeds in cases where
the accused has done absolutely nothing to inquire into the age of the
80 Ibid at para 18.
81 Ibid at para 19.
82 The facts of George, supra note 74 are very unusual, and not merely because they
involve a female accused and a male complainant. George is the only case we are aware
of involving a female accused where there was not some sort of relationship of trust or
authority and/or some attempt to cultivate an exploitative relationship over a period of
time. In George's initial description of the sexual activity, she could be understood as saying
that the accused sexually assaulted her, although at trial the case proceeded on the basis that
she was consenting.
83 Slater, supra note 44 at paras 24, 28.
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complainant beyond observing her and making assumptions based on her
appearance or her behaviour. In several cases, courts have held that mere
observation can obviate the need for taking any steps. 8 4
If the complainant dresses like a 16-year-old (whatever that means),
or spends time with other young people over 16, smokes cigarettes or
consumes alcohol, initiates sexual activity or appears to have had any kind
of prior sexual experience, courts are more likely to say that an accused
has to do nothing beyond observing the complainant to ascertain her age.
He does not need to ask the complainant her age, nor does he need to ask
adults who know the complainant. Rather, the accused is allowed to infer
age from his simple observation of the way a complainant presents herself
as compared to his stereotypical assumptions about how a 16-year-old girl
should present herself8 5
Stereotypes about how girls and young women dress and carry
themselves, whether they consume alcohol and at what age certain
behaviours are likely to be demonstrated are particularly pervasive in
these cases.86 These assumptions are founded on the same stereotypes
that infuse the consent determinations for women over the age of consent
and reveal the same tendency toward victim blaming we see with adult
women. The stereotype for women is that if they dress in a particular way
or consume intoxicants, they are inviting sexual attention or are open to
sex with anyone; the stereotype for girls is that if they are dressing in a
particular way or consuming intoxicants, they are ready for sexual activity,
and therefore must be old enough.
Courts describe these circumstances as "[obviating] the need for an
inquiry."8 7 What this means is substituting inferences based on stereotypes
84 See e.g. Tannas, supra note 15; LTP, supra note 66; R v Mastel, 2010 SKPC 66, 88
WCB (2d) 399; R v RR, 2014 ONCJ 96, 112 WCB (2d) 302 [RR].
85 Tannas, supra note 15 at paras 32, 33.
86 See e.g. RR, supra note 84 at para 15; Tannas, supra note 15 at paras 8 9, 33 34.
In R v Chapman, 2016 ONCA 310, 130 OR (3d) 515, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2016
CarswellOnt 16185 (13 October 2016) [Chapman], the Crown appealed the trial decision
to acquit the accused of all charges. Sexually suggestive and mature behaviour, appearance
and demeanour were cited in establishing that the accused had taken all reasonable steps to
ascertain the complainant's age. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed. In R v Poirier, 2011
ABPC 350 at paras 76 82, [2011] AJ No 1283, the trial judge, in finding a reasonable doubt
about all reasonable steps, referred to the complainant's consumption of alcohol and other
related behaviours. This decision was upheld on appeal: R v Poirier, 2014 ABCA 59, 112
WCB (2d) 93 [Poirier].
87 In Osborne, supra note 43 at para 62 the Court states: "Parliament made the
act a crime and expects of citizens engaging in sexual activity with young people to make
a reasonable effort to ascertain the age of prospective partners. It is more than a casual
requirement. There must be an earnest inquiry or some other compelling factor that
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for actual steps or inquiries to ascertain age. This is true even where the
accused may not have even asked the complainant how old she is. Often,
significant quantities of alcohol have been consumed by the teenaged
complainant before the sexual activity in question.88 This is seen as
strengthening the accused's defence because of her adult behaviour, rather
than as making the complainant a more vulnerable target for sexual
exploitation.
The idea that a visual observation of the complainant could be enough
to constitute "all reasonable steps" first emerged in the 1997 decision of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in R v LTP 89 In that case, decided at a
time when the age of consent was 14, both the complainant (aged 13) and
the accused (aged 16) were teenagers. They were at a party on a riverbank.
The complainant alleged that the accused pushed her down and raped her.
The Court never considered this claim, focusing instead on the mistake
of age claim. The trial judge found that the accused gave no thought
whatsoever to the complainant's age, but the Court of Appeal overturned
this factual determination largely on the basis that it was reasonable in the
circumstances for the accused not to think about it:
As the cases show, it may not necessarily be unreasonable to rely only on a visual
observation. The reasonableness of a failure to take further steps will depend upon
a consideration of all the circumstances, including the indicia of the complainant's
age and the accused's knowledge of those indicia ... Here, the learned trial
judge did not instruct himself in that way. He did not ask himself whether the
complainant's appearance, and all of the other circumstances, were such as to give
rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether it would have been reasonable for the
accused to be put on his inquiry, and whether it was reasonable for him not to put
his mind to the complainant's age in the circumstances.
9 0
This passage incorrectly extends the availability of the defence beyond the
statutory language to circumstances where it would be reasonable for the
accused not to think about the complainant's age.
obviates the need for an inquiry." This passage is quoted in Mastel, supra note 53 at para 21
and is cited in Tannas, supra note 15 at para 25.
88 See Poirier, supra note 86 and R v B(JB), 2013 ABPC 191, 2013 CarswellAlta
1434. In these cases, a significant quantity of alcohol was consumed. In R v H(JJ), 2011
PESC 8,308 Nfld & PEIR 252, the accused's suggestion that the complainant was too drunk
to remember what happened was not accepted by the Court. However, in all three cases, the
Court did convict on the basis of non-consent.
89 LTP, supra note 66.
90 Ibid at para 27.
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It seems to us that the cases in which a visual observation will be
sufficient should be exceedingly rare.91 Perhaps if the complainant is
observed driving a car in rush hour traffic, or meets the accused in a law
school orientation program, there are non-stereotypical indicia to support
an honest belief that the complainant is at least 16. Drinking, smoking and
hanging out with people a grade or two older are not equivalent.92
Even more troubling is that in many of the cases that apply LTP in this
way, the accused is not a teenager but is instead many years older than the
complainant. This is most clearly demonstrated in the Court of Appeal
for Saskatchewan decision in R v Tannas.93 The complainant C.W was a
13-year-old girl who organized a birthday party for her mother, inviting
several of her mother's friends and coworkers. The accused was 26 years
old and came to the party as the date of an 18-year-old. The younger
guests at the party, including C.W, congregated in one room while the
older guests, including C.W's parents, were upstairs. Both groups were
drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana and, according to the testimony
of the accused, the complainant did drink alcohol.94 At about 1:00 a.m., the
younger group went to another house to continue the party and C.W, with
her mother's permission, went with them. More drugs were consumed
and C.W smoked "honey oil" with the others. Eventually, when only the
complainant and the accused remained awake, there was sexual activity,
including unprotected sexual intercourse.
The complainant denied that she had been a willing participant, a
claim that was quickly dismissed by the trial judge. The accused testified
to what the Court of Appeal described as "consensual sex". The trial judge
accepted the accused's version of events, namely that C.W agreed to engage
in sexual activity, but found that the accused had not taken all reasonable
steps to ascertain her age. The trial judge was particularly concerned about
the age disparity between the complainant and the accused, suggesting that
a significant age disparity may heighten what steps needed to be taken.
The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and entered an acquittal,95
conceding that the accused "made no inquiry whatsoever as to C.W.'s age"
but added that the law did not require him to do SO. 96
91 See the approach of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Osborne, supra note
43 at para 62 where the court noted that the "all reasonable steps" requirement is "more than
a casual requirement. There must be an earnest inquiry or some other compelling factor
that obviates the need for an inquiry".
92 Mastel, supra note 53 at para 8.
93 Tannas, supra note 15.
94 Ibid at paras 15, 33.
95 Ibid at para 41.
96 Ibid at para 27.
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The Court of Appeal begins by saying that it might seem obvious that
the accused could have asked the complainant how old she was. However,
the Court held that the accused's failure to make this simple inquiry was
not dispositive of whether he had taken all reasonable steps. Instead, the
Crown had to prove that there were no circumstances that obviated the
need for an inquiry.97 Through the use of a double negative, this incorrectly
turns the all reasonable steps requirement on its head. The Code requires
that all reasonable steps be taken before an accused can assert a mistaken
belief. Once the accused raises an air of reality that he was mistaken and
that he had taken all reasonable steps, then the Crown must disprove that
he took such steps beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown should not be
required to prove that reasonable steps are required at all in a particular
case. The fact that the complainant was under age is sufficient to trigger
the all reasonable steps requirement.
The Court held that the accused's visual observation obviated the
need for any inquiry on the part of the accused, and that the trial judge
had erred in putting too much weight on the age disparity between the
parties because the judge failed to turn his mind to whether a reasonable
person in the accused's circumstances would have objectively perceived
the subject of age disparity. Here the Court is reading words into section
150.1(4), which Parliament deliberately chose to leave out of the section.
The mistaken belief in consent defence explicitly provides that the accused
must take reasonable steps "in the circumstances known" to him. Section
150.1(4) does not include this limitation in the mistake of age defence. It
simply says the accused must take all reasonable steps.
The Court of Appeal was particularly critical of the trial judge for failing
to state what reasonable step was missing in this case. This is particularly
troubling when the accused was in a house with a significant number of
people who knew the complainant's age and had ample opportunity to
ask the complainant herself. This is not to suggest that simply asking the
complainant her age would have been enough in this case, particularly
given that teenagers are known to lie about their ages for a variety of
reasons. 98 However, when there are such obvious steps untaken, how can
it be said that the Crown had not discharged its onus?
Why did the Court not require the accused to do anything? Witnesses
testified that C.W. was mature in her appearance, attire and attitude. Some
97 Ibid.
98 Much of the research on lies told by teenagers is focused on the topic of social
media and Internet presence. One scholar notes: "most teenagers I interviewed confessed to
having lied about their age when they registered for instant messaging or social networking
sites": Karen Bradley, "Internet Lives: Social Context and Moral Domain in Adolescent
Development" (2006) 108:1 New Directions for Youth Development 57 at 66. In fact, one
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other people at the party thought that she was at least 16. She smoked
marijuana and drank alcohol. These circumstances, and the fact that they
had just met, were relevant to what steps a reasonable person would have
taken in the Court's view. The Court could see "no reasonable steps left
untaken by Mr. Tannas" 99 The Court in Tannas effectively reduces "all
reasonable steps" to whatever steps seem necessary based on the accused's
stereotyped assumptions about how 16, but not 13, year-old girls are
supposed to look and act. The suggestion that an accused has a lower
obligation because he had just met the complainant is problematic. Surely
if the complainant is a virtual stranger to the accused, the requirement
to take reasonable steps is heightened because of the greater potential
for mistake given one's lack of information. 100 The Court of Appeal held
that the trial judge erred in putting too much weight on the age disparity
between the complainant and the accused. 10 1 Other courts have confirmed
that the greater the apparent disparity in ages, the greater the requirement
to make inquiries about the complainant's age. 102
In R v Mastel,10 3 the accused, who was 43 years old at the time of
the offence, had sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old grade 10 student.
They had met regularly at minor league hockey games they both attended
where the complainant sat in the "Kids Zone" reserved for children up to
news source reports that "more than 80% of children lie about their age when using social
media": Mark Sweeney, "More Than 80% of Children Lie About Their Age to Use Sites
Like Facebook', The Guardian (26 July 2013), online: <www.theguardian.com/media/2013/
jul/26/children-lie-age-facebook-asa>.
99 Tannas, supra note 15 at para 35 [emphasis in original].
100 See also R v Nguyen, 2017 SKCA 30 at para 19, 138 WCB (2d) 509, where the
Court finds the accused willfully blind for not inquiring into her age but goes on to say, "if
the evidence were such that Mr. Nguyen had first met the complainant just before they had
sex, the inference in this regard might have been unavailable.' Other cases do acknowledge
that not knowing the complainant heightens the responsibility to make inquiries. See e.g.
R v RKD, 2012 ABPC 205, 546 AR 168, where the trial judge noted that the accused and
the complainant did not know each other prior to the night in question. Relying on case
law on reasonable steps to ascertain consent, the trial judge at para 67 held that "the less
acquainted partners are with each other, the more steps are required to confirm that they
consent to sexual activity".
101 Tannas, supra note 15 at para 30.
102 SeeR v RAK, [1996] NBJ No 104 at para 11, 175 NBR (2d) 225 [RAK]. See also
R v P(LT), [ 1997] BCJ No 24 at para 18, 86 BCAC 20, where the Court appears to adopt the
reasoning in RAK that "the greater the disparity in ages between the two parties, the greater
the level of inquiry to be called for on the accused's part'" which goes to whether or not the
accused took all reasonable steps; R v Quintanilla, 1999 ABQB 769 at para 118, 251 AR
59 also supports the Court's decision in RAK in that "a substantial age differential ... will
invariably require a greater amount of inquiry on the part of an accused, and is one factor
to be considered in determining whether reasonable steps have been taken'.
103 Mastel, supra note 53.
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15 years of age. On the night in question, the teenaged complainant was
staying with a girlfriend and she snuck out and met the accused. He gave
her alcohol to the point where her friends testified she could barely walk
or speak. He refused to tell her his last name and warned her not to tell
anybody of their sexual encounter.
The trial judge acquitted the accused even though he found that the
accused had made "little effort to ascertain her age". 104 The trial judge held
that this was one of those cases where visual observation of the complainant
was sufficient. No further steps were necessary because "on the night in
question, the complainant took the initiative to meet with the accused,
admitted she had experience with alcohol, initiated the sexual contact and
was familiar with oral sex." 10 5 The Court of Appeal overturned this finding
because the accused had done nothing to ascertain her age:
In this case, the respondent knew the complainant was a young girl when he first
met her. He observed her over the course of approximately two years. The trial
judge found it was likely that the complainant had told the respondent she was
in grade 10. The respondent testified he knew she was in middle school prior to
attending high school when he first started talking to her. Through this lengthy
period of time, the respondent took no steps to ascertain her age. According to his
testimony, they had numerous conversations over the years and the respondent
was 41 years of age at the time of their first meeting and again he never asked the
complainant her age. 106
Reliance on how a girl looks should never be sufficient to constitute all
reasonable steps. Teenagers mature at different rates in both physical and
emotional terms, with girls often developing physically earlier than boys.
Many 14 and 15-year-olds could pass for 16 and vice versa. The idea that a
man could distinguish between a girl who is, for example, 14 and a girl who
is 16 from mere observation is patently unrealistic. just as physiological
and emotional maturity vary considerably, so does behaviour. By requiring
an accused to take all reasonable steps, Parliament could not have meant
that the accused did not have to take any steps if he got the impression
from a girl's behaviour that she could be 16.
The interpretation by courts that assumptions about the complainant's
behaviour will relieve the accused from taking any steps leads inevitably
to the conclusion that sexual abuse involving the most vulnerable girls
will be the most difficult to prosecute. Many children under the age of 16
live lives that are outside the idealized view of the normal life of a young
104 Ibid at para 14.
105 Ibidatpara 18.
106 Ibid at para 16.
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person, possibly because they have been inappropriately sexualized in the
past and/or consigned to inadequate state care. A girl who is living on the
street, for example, may well be out at all hours of the night. She is more
likely to have "sexual experience", probably in the form of sexual assault
or exploitation in prostitution. Allowing inferences about age to be drawn
from mere observation will inevitably have a disproportionate impact on
Indigenous girls who are more likely to be in state care. In addition, there
is a clear pattern of sexualizing Indigenous girls at younger ages than non-
Indigenous girls, based on racist assumptions about their hypersexuality.10 7
Even where young people are not in positions of extreme vulnerability,
some parents allow their children to consume alcohol or smoke cigarettes
in their presence,108 or stay out late at night.109 Stereotypes that a girl under
16 dresses in loose-fitting clothes and sneakers, does not smoke, does not
drink, is never out late at night and never initiates sexual activity, feed into
this construction of the ideal child victim. 110 In essence, reliance on these
factors mirrors, through the proxy of age, the doctrine of implied consent
rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ewanchuk.111
These stereotypes are particularly powerful in cases involving girls
engaging in risky behaviours. For example, in R v Chapman,112 the
40-year-old accused picked up two girls hitchhiking at night. The girls,
aged 14 and 15, made sexually explicit comments while in the car, wore
makeup and smoked cigarettes. They told the accused they had just come
from a college party. The accused took them to his parents' house, gave
them alcohol and had sexual intercourse with both girls. The accused did
not ask their ages, nor did they volunteer that information. Despite the
fact that the accused made no effort to ascertain their ages, the trial judge
acquitted the accused on the basis that he had taken all reasonable steps
to ascertain their age. The Court of Appeal upheld those acquittals and
confirmed that all reasonable steps can be satisfied by mere observation:
Of course, this does not mean that a complainant's conduct and appearance
will always obviate the need for further inquiry about the complainant's age. A
reasonable person would appreciate that underage children may apply make-up
107 Tracey Lindberg, Priscilla Campeau & Maria Campbell, "Indigenous Women
and Sexual Assault in Canada" in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law,
Legal Practice and Women's Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 87.
108 Tannas, supra note 15 at para 33.
109 R vAkinsuyi, 2016 ONSC 2103 at paras 19,22, 129 WCB (2d) 515 [Akinsuyi].
110 Melanie Randall, "Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and 'Ideal Victims': Consent,
Resistance, and Victim Blaming" (2011) 22:2 CJWL 397 at 398, 413 [Randall, "Ideal
Victims"].
111 RvEwanchuk, 1999 SCC 711, [1999] 1 SCR 330.
112 Chapman, supra note 86.
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and dress and act so as to appear older. However, in this case, it is my view that
the combined effect of the evidence of the information provided to the respondent
and the observations made by him justified the trial judge's conclusion that the
need to inquire further about the complainants' ages was obviated. 
11 3
The Court's long list of factors relevant to the reasonable steps defence
all relate to criticisms of the complainants and the degree to which they
tried to portray themselves as older. The fact that a young person has been
previously sexualized is an unreliable marker of age. Many girls younger
than 16 have sexual experience just as many girls over 16 do not.1 14 For girls
under 16, much of that sexual experience will have been non-consensual
or at the very least exploitative. The Court of Appeal put significant blame
on the complainants, stressing how they purposely did not disclose their
ages although the same motivation is not attributed to the accused, who
purposely never asked. Instead, 14 and 15-year-old girls are portrayed as
temptresses, enticing a 40-year-old man into a sexual liaison which he
could hardly be expected to resist. He thought they were "17 or 18 years
old 115 thus admitting he did not know how old they were and that he
believed them to be adolescents. This is evidence that the accused was, at
a minimum, reckless as to the age of the complainants, namely that he saw
the risk that they were less than 16 but took the chance anyway. He did
absolutely nothing to ascertain their ages and doing nothing was found to
be sufficient to constitute taking "all reasonable steps". 116
E) The Accused Is Never Required to Refrain From Sexual
Activity
The judicial interpretation of the all reasonable steps provision in these
cases assumes that there is always some basis for being mistaken and that
there are always some steps (obviously inadequate because the accused
remains mistaken) that can be taken. We simply do not see courts
suggesting that in particularly problematic circumstances the accused
should have refrained from engaging in sexual activity with the girl in
113 Ibid at para 53.
114 According to Statistics Canada, "about 94% of girls aged 15 to 19 reported having
sexual intercourse in the previous 12 months, and their average age at first intercourse
was 15.8 years": Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report,
Catalogue No 89-503-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, March 2016) at 16. Similarly, in an
extensive survey conducted in 2005, researchers found that 27% of Canadian girls were
sexually active at a mean age of 15: Frappier et al, "Sex and Sexual Health: A Survey of
Canadian Youth and Mothers" (2008) 13:1 Paediatrics & Child Health 25 at 27.
115 Chapman, supra note 86 at para 9.
116 See also Akinsuyi, supra note 109 at para 22, where the Court pointed to the fact
that "C.W did not act like a 14-year-old living with her parents. She stayed out all night. She
came to visit Mr. Akinsuyi unannounced late in the evening'
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question at that time. Rather, the accused is always entitled to proceed
and the lack of information he has access to at that moment seems to
lower rather than raise his obligations. This endorsement of male sexual
entitlement is deeply troubling.
For example, in R v Gashikanyi, the 33-year-old accused picked up
two hungry teenage runaways, one 18 and the other 14, at a bus stop at
3 AM. The younger girl was not wearing shoes. He offered to take them
home and feed them, which he did, and then had sexual intercourse
with each girl twice. The accused did not use a condom for the second
act of intercourse with the 14-year-old. The police found the 14-year-old
complainant the next day "wearing pants bloodstained in the crotch. The
attending police officer described her as withdrawn, dehydrated, fatigued
and scared" 117 The accused was convicted on the basis that the steps he
took (asking the older girl how old her cousin was) were inadequate. We
would go further and argue that in this context there were no steps the
accused could have taken that would have justified having unprotected
sexual intercourse with a girl he just met and knew to be a teenager.118
These girls, and particularly the younger one, were obviously vulnerable
and in a situation where they were unlikely to be forthcoming about their
ages. The accused claimed that he thought the girls were in prostitution
(although he did not pay them other than giving them $10 for bus fare
when he dropped them off) and believed that the 14-year-old was in fact
17. However, even if this belief were correct, he would still be intentionally
committing the offence of purchasing sexual services from a person under
the age of 18.119 In other words, the accused was admitting he thought she
was a child prostitute, which should not improve his position.120
The accused did not ask the complainant her age although he did ask
her cousin, who lied about the other girl's age. However, teenagers running
away from home, found at 3 AM, may well lie about their ages to avoid
getting in trouble. So, a simple inquiry about how old the complainant
117 R v Gashikanyi, 2015 ABCA 1 at para 5,588 AR 386 [Gashikanyi].
118 Ibid. Some of the facts are taken from a Crown appeal of the sentencing decision:
R v Gashikanyi, 2017 ABCA 194, 140 WCB (2d) 107.
119 Obtaining sexual services for money is now a crime regardless of the age of the
person bought: Section 286.1 of the Code, supra note 8.
120 Ibid. There was no evidence in this case that he exchanged money for sexual
services although he did feed the hungry girls. A similar defence was raised in R v Merrlles
(2015), 133 WCB (2d) 294 at 8, 10, 2015 CarswellSask 912. The accused testified that the
complainant offered to sell him sex for money and that she told him she was 16 years old.
There is no discussion in the judgment of the fact that purchasing sex from a 16-year-old
is a criminal offence. The accused's testimony was rejected, and he was convicted. The
conviction was upheld on appeal: R v Merrlles, 2016 SKCA 128 at para 9, 133 WCB (2d)
489.
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was would likely have been insufficient in this context. The circumstances
of this case were such that there were not many steps available at that
moment that the accused could have taken to ascertain the age of the
complainant, although he certainly could have asked her directly. Where
the circumstances prevent the accused from taking sufficient reasonable
steps, surely the law should require that he refrain from having sex until
those steps can be taken. 121
The law fails to protect the most vulnerable children if it says that an
accused can proceed in situations where multiple red flags were raised
but no obvious steps were available to the accused. This situation is most
likely to arise where the accused encounters the complainant in a setting
divorced from any context that might identify her age. This is more likely
when the accused and complainant meet online, or where the complainant
is a runaway or homeless. This approach by the courts inevitably denies
the protection of the law to our most vulnerable girls precisely because
they are vulnerable. It disproportionately impacts Indigenous girls who are
more likely to be sexualized at younger ages than non-Indigenous girls,
often through sexual assault.122
121 In R v Lewis, 2015 SKQB 291, 483 Sask R 123, a 48 year-old man had sex with a
16-year-old girl in exchange for money. The complainant apparently told the accused she
was 23 and he accepted that information. At para 82, the trial judge found that " [a]part from
asking for some identification bearing K.O.'s date of birth, I can think of no further step he
could have taken in the circumstances." It never occurs to the trial judge to suggest that the
accused should refrain from engaging in sexual activity until making sure the complainant
is in fact 18 years of age, or that asking for identification would be entirely logical in the
context of the accused's portrayal of the exchange as a commercial transaction.
122 See de Finney, "Narratives of Indigenous Girlhood" supra note 55 at 170:
"Indigenous girls in the West live the intergenerational effects of systemic racialized/
gendered/sexualized/classed colonialism that excludes them from normative notions
of Western girlhood. Their positioning as perpetual 'others' to white Canadian
citizenship directly contradicts neoliberal demands on girls to self-actualize. They are
disproportionately represented in indicators of social exclusion and are most at risk of
poverty, racialized violence and sexual exploitation due in part to persistent colonial
images of Indigenous girls and women as drunk, passive, mysterious romanticized
versions of colonial property." Robyn Bourgeois, "Colonial Exploitation: The Canadian
State and the Trafficking of Indigenous Women and Girls in Canada" (2015) 62:6 UCLA L
Rev 1426 at 1462 63 notes that the disturbing number of Indigenous children in the child
welfare system who have experienced dislocation and family disruption also heightens
the risk of sexual violence.' See also Canada, Representative for Children and Youth, Too
Many Victims: Sexualized Violence in the Lives of Children and Youth in Care (Victoria:
Representative for Children and Youth, 2016) at 8: "Aboriginal girls and young women
experience especially high rates of sexualized violence because of issues related to poverty,
intergenerational trauma, isolation and devaluing attitudes toward them within society";
See also Judith Mosoff et al, "Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child Protection Law
in BC" (2017) 50:2 UBC L Rev 435.
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This failure to require men to desist is evident in R v Hoffart, a case
which presents a more sympathetic accused than many of the cases we
reviewed.123 In Hoffartthe accused was 28 years old. He met the 15-year-old
complainant online; she listed her age as 20. Her online name was "Dimples
1993" which reflected her actual birth year, although the accused testified
that this fact never occurred to him. The complainant told the accused
that she lived with a roommate and that she had previously worked as an
assistant buyer in Ontario. She spoke about other men in their late 20s who
were currently pursuing her. The accused thought the complainant looked
young, but when he repeatedly asked her age she maintained that she was
in fact 20. He testified that he thought she was "Asian or Native" and that
he had heard that Asian and Native women often looked younger and
smaller than other women.124 The complainant was in fact an Indigenous
girl living with adoptive parents and having difficulty with her adoptive
father. She arranged to meet the accused at a gas station, saying that her
roommate did not want to be disturbed. On their second meeting, they
engaged in sexual activity in his truck. The complainant's parents learned
what had happened and the accused was arrested.
The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that he honestly believed
that the complainant was over 16. It is not clear, however, what the accused
did that could amount to all reasonable steps. It is true that the complainant
offered more details than in most cases to bolster her claim that she was an
adult. However, all of these details came from the complainant herself It
would have been easy for the accused to wait to initiate a sexual relationship
until he was able to see the complainant in the context of her job or to meet
her family or friends. He was clearly suspicious about her age as he asked
her about it multiple times. The Court seems to be asking whether there
was anything more that could be done to determine the complainant's age
on that occasion in the gas station parking lot, instead of whether there were
other reasonable steps instead of meeting up with her in that clandestine
setting.
We found one case, R v HL, that does recognize that some
circumstances are simply inadequate to allow for all reasonable steps. 125 In
that case the accused, aged 25, and the complainant, aged 14, met online.
Both the accused and the complainant were Punjabi and the accused
tried to rely on this fact to bolster his claim that he was inexperienced
in dealing with women. The complainant had intellectual disabilities that
were apparent to the accused in her communication and her behaviour.
123 R v Hoffart, 2010 ABPC 122 at paras 2,9,495 AR 57 [Hoffart].
124 Ibid at para 9, the trial judge stated "[h]e has never had a Native or Asian
girlfriend and or even known any personally. He has heard and believes that they often
look much younger than their actual age'"
125 R v HL, 2017 ONSC 6205, 143 WCB (2d) 173 [HL].
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After a couple of brief non-sexual meetings in the accused's car, they had
unprotected intercourse and fellatio in a hotel room. The Court found
that the complainant was both incapable of consenting due to mental
disability and that the accused had failed to take all reasonable steps to
ascertain her age. 126
The Court's reasoning unfortunately keeps these two lines of inquiry
mostly separate, 127 even though it was clear that disability and youth were
both operating simultaneously for the complainant.128 Nonetheless, the
analysis of mistake of age is more rigorous than what we have seen in many
other cases. Justice Harris held that, given the conflicting evidence about
whether the complainant told the accused she was 16, he had a reasonable
doubt on the question of the accused's actual belief. 129 However, the Court
emphasized that the accused's belief and the factors that informed it were
not the focus of the all reasonable steps inquiry because it is those steps
that are supposed to provide the basis of the belief. In addition, reasonable
steps cannot be based on the sexual activity itself.130
The Court held that what would constitute all reasonable steps was
heightened given that the accused believed that the complainant was just
16, her obvious difficulties in communication and the fact that they did
not know each other well.131 The only reasonable step the Court is able
to identify is asking the complainant for identification, which the Court
recognized that the complainant might not be able to provide. We hope
that in those circumstances the accused would have been required to desist
for the time being, rather to proceed on the basis that he had done what
he could.
F) Problems with Sexual History Evidence
Finally, we saw problems with the courts' use of evidence about a girl's
prior sexual historyin these cases. Parliament has developed a legal regime,
126 Ibid at paras 19, 109.
127 The decision treats the question of capacity to consent on the basis of disability
as relevant to the sexual assault count, and the defence of mistake of age as relevant to the
sexual interference count. In fact, the rejection of the mistake of age defence could have
applied equally to secure a conviction on both counts and it was not necessary to devote
significant attention to finding the complainant incapable of consenting on the basis of her
disability.
128 HL, supra note 125 at para 107.
129 Ibidatpara 101.
130 Ibid at para 105.
131 Ibid at para 105, Justice Harris also indicates that the difference between
reasonable steps and all reasonable steps does not amount to much in practical terms. This
is contrary to the legislative record, which makes clear that this distinction was deliberate.
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delineated in section 276 of the Code, for determining whether evidence of
the complainant's past sexual history is admissible as being relevant to an
issue at trial. Such evidence is not admissible to perpetuate the myth that
past sexual experience makes it more likely that the complainant consented
to the sexual activity in question or the myth that she is less credible because
of her sexual history.132 Sexual history evidence is a particularly complex
part of mistaken belief in age cases because the evidence is relied on not to
support the myth that by reason of her prior experience the complainant
was more likely to consent, but rather to support the argument that the
accused was mistaken about the complainant's age or that the reasonable
steps required to ascertain age were less because he believed that the
complainant had engaged in sexual activity in the past. In some cases,
this evidence comes from the complainant herself and may be entirely
fabricated. In this respect, her actual sexual history may be less important
than the accused's perception of her sexual history since the evidence is
going to his mistaken belief In other words, sexual history evidence does
not even need to be true, so long as the accused believes it to be true, in
order to be asserted as relevant to the accused's mistaken belief.133
In some cases, we saw the section 276 process ignored altogether. In
R v E,134 the complainant, who was 12 years old at the time of the sexual
activity, was cross-examined "about the fact that around the time she was
having sex with Mr. E., she was also sexually involved with other older
boys or young men around his age."135 The case gives no indication that a
section 276 application was brought to determine the admissibility of the
sexual history evidence even though it was clearly required. This evidence
was part of the portrayal of this young girl as the sexual aggressor rather
than as a child who had clearly been inappropriately sexualized by older
men.
At trial, the complainant testified by way of video. She was 14 years
old when testifying about offences that took place when she was 12. The
trial judge's assessment of the video was to "agree with Defence counsel,
Ms. Stevens, that the video certainly does not portray, as Counsel puts it,
"the body of a child" 136 He went on to describe her as a girl "who had
the anatomical development of breasts consistent with teenage years, and
that this is something which would have been obvious to the accused as a
visual impression."137 Aside from the fact that her physical development at
the age of 14 tells us nothing about how old she looked when she was 12,
132 Section 276 of the Code, supra note 8.
133 See Hoffart, supra note 123 at paras 11, 15; Chapman, supra note 86.
134 R v E, supra note 37.
135 Ibidat para41.
136 Ibid at para 70.
137 Ibid at para 72.
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or the fact that most girls will have developed breasts before the age of 16,
allowing men to rely on the development of breasts or inappropriate sexual
behaviour to conclude that a child is 16 undercuts the objective of the "all
reasonable steps" provision.
In addition to specific sexual history evidence, it is common to see the
accused try to admit evidence that when he had sex with the complainant,
she appeared to be sexually experienced. A claim that she initiated the
sexual activity, or was familiar with how to perform oral sex, is used to
imply a previous sexual history without actually bringing in evidence of
one. Such evidence is premised on the same myths and stereotypes that
section 276 guards against. The stereotype in these cases is that a girl's prior
sexualization makes it more likely that she is over 16 and thus sexually
available to the accused. Given the prevalence of child sexual abuse, and
the prevalence of sexual activity amongst young teenagers, evidence of
sexual experience is not helpful in determining the complainant's age.
In R v Quinones138 where the 24-year-old accused was asked about why
he thought the complainant was older than her actual age of 12, he stated
"the experience, the way-the way everything-the-the way we kissed,
the way we hold hands and everything. It was-it was not new to her."139
The Court went on to clarify that the complainant confirmed that she did
have sexual experience and was using birth control. This information was
not available to the accused prior to initiating sexual activity with her; and
could not have shaped any mistaken belief. All it tells us, sadly, is that this
girl was sexually abused before the age of 12. By definition, this sexual
activity would have been without consent because a girl younger than 12 is
not capable of consenting to sex with anyone. The reality is that this abuse
may have been by her father, her mother's boyfriend, a family friend or an
older man. In addition, the issue is not whether the accused believed the
complainant to be older than 12, it is whether he believed her to be at least
16.
The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan in George states compellingly
that evidence that a complainant was comfortable in participating in sexual
activity is not legally relevant:
I note as well on this front that the fact a sexual act itself reveals a child to be sexually
aware or sexually experienced cannot, as a matter of law, have any relevance to the
nature of the steps and accused should have taken to ascertain the age of the child
in the first place. The essential foundation of s. 150.1 of the Code is the notion that
children under the age of 16 are not legally competent to consent to sexual activity.
138 R v Quinones, 2012 BCCA 94, 100 WCB (2d) 122.
139 Ibid at para 44.
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The provision is designed, at least in meaningful part, to protect those children
who, because of their involvement in the sex trade or otherwise, have become
familiar with sex and sexual acts. It would be entirely perverse to allow the fact
that a child ultimately turns out to be sexually experienced to diminish or limit the
steps a person in Ms. George's position might reasonably be expected to have taken
in advance of the sexual encounter to ensure the child is at least 16 years of age.
14 0
We believe that the following principles ought to apply in these cases. The
accused should not be able to rely on the complainant's apparent familiarity
with sex to support his mistaken belief in age claim. If the accused learns
this from the sex acts he is engaging in with the complainant, the sexual
assault is already underway. The accused cannot rely on a belief in age
developed after the fact. It also ignores the fact that, given the prevalence
of child sexual abuse, familiarity with sex acts tells us nothing useful about
someones age.
If the accused wants to rely on his knowledge of past sexual acts with
others of which he is aware, these need to be subjected to a section 276
application. To pass the threshold for admissibility, the defence needs to
offer evidence of specific instances of sexual activity, and the evidence
must have significant probative value not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Evidence that the complainant appeared to be sexually
experienced is akin to evidence of sexual reputation, which is deemed
inadmissible under section 277.
In cases where the complainant provides the accused with descriptions
of past relationships that meet the threshold of "specific instances of sexual
activity', the balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect is required.
The inquiry ought to focus on whether the evidence could support a belief
that the complainant was 16 or older and whether the evidence may call
on discriminatory beliefs. In Hoffart, the complainant described in detail
(imaginary) relationships with several men in their late 20s, describing
their bad behaviours and eliciting the accused's support in the course of
their online conversations. This evidence was specific, detailed and not
inherently unbelievable and should pass the section 276 threshold. It
could have supported a belief that the complainant was an adult, without
invading her privacy or depicting her as promiscuous. 141
By contrast, the bragging of the hitchhiking teenage runaways in
Chapman about their supposed sexual exploits with both male and female
partners was far less probative and much more prejudicial. It should have
put the accused on high alert that the complainants were trying to appear
140 George 2016, supra note 79 at para 40.
141 Hoffart, supra note 123.
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worldly and could not on its own have supported a belief that they were
old enough to consent. It had limited probative value on the question of
their age and was highly prejudicial to the complainants, painting them
as promiscuous and sexually indiscriminate. 142 This prejudice would be
heightened in a case where the Crown is trying to prove non-consent apart
from the issue of age. In such a case, the risk that the evidence will be
improperly used to infer actual consent, reasoning expressly prohibited by
section 276, is very high.
Conclusion
Many of the cases in which a defence of mistake of age are raised are
ones in which the sexual activity occurs soon after the complainant and
accused meet, in circumstances where the accused does not wait to find
out anything about the complainant's life, her friends or her family. Other
cases involve grooming behaviour over a period of time during which
the complainant is encouraged to keep her relationship with the accused
a secret from those around her. In almost every case we looked at, the
accused either did not turn his mind to the complainant's age or asserted
a belief that the complainant was an older teenager, that is, somewhere
close to the age of consent. If the accused does not even consider the
complainant's age, there should be no defence because the accused does
not have an honest belief in the complainant's age. If the accused believes
the complainant is somewhere in her late teens, the accused is aware of the
danger that the complainant may be below the age of consent, meaning
that the all reasonable steps requirement must be given real content before
there can be a reasonable doubt that the accused genuinely believed the
complainant was 16 or older. Anything less is simply willful blindness,
which the criminal law treats as equivalent to actual knowledge.
We found many cases in which the accused made assumptions about
the complainant's age based on observations based on stereotypes that do
not accord with the reality of adolescent behaviour or development for
many girls. Unfortunately, instead of giving meaning to the all reasonable
steps requirement, courts too often endorse this kind of reasoning and
find that the accused did not have to do anything, effectively blaming the
victim for her own exploitation. Such an approach inevitably singles out for
particular disadvantage Indigenous girls who are more likely to be living
in unstable home situations and who have already been sexually exploited.
The following description of a young complainant by a judge demonstrates
the power that multiple stereotypes have when they are applied together:
142 Chapman, supra note 86.
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She lied to the Accused at some point about her age. The complainant portrayed
herself as older than she really was. She wore makeup. She dressed older. She
frequently stayed out late. She posted pictures of herself on Facebook designed to
make her look sexually mature. She hung around with girls who were known by
both of them to be 15 and 16. While there is more than four years age difference
between them, the complainant appeared in her video statement given at the time
of the events and later in court to be a girl who looked older than she really was.
M.T's text messages reveal a vocabulary and imagery concerning sexual matters
similar to that of a much older girl. 
14 3
The girl described in this paragraph was 12 years old at the time of the
sexual activity. Yet the Court is endorsing the very stereotypes which
formed the basis of the accused's apparent mistake.
These cases demonstrate that the same stereotypes that have for so
long infiltrated case law involving adult women complainants, and the
accompanying suggestion that women are responsible for the sexual
violence committed against them, 144 are evident in cases dealing with
adolescent girls even if they are reproduced in slightly different forms.
In both contexts, victims are constructed as "asking for it" based on their
appearance and risky behaviours.
When speaking about the mistaken belief in consent defence, the
Supreme Court of Canada has said that the defence should only succeed in
rare circumstances, noting that people do not often commit sexual assault
per incuriam.145 We believe that the mistaken belief in age defence should
be similarly rare. It should be the unusual circumstance where, after all
reasonable steps to ascertain a person's age are taken, a reasonable person
would have a genuine mistaken belief that a girl was 16 years of age or
older when in fact she was not. We saw many cases in which the accused
appeared to be looking for justifications in the complainant's behaviour
that would allow him to proceed with plausible deniability, rather than
trying to actually verify how old the complainant was. We need to move
beyond the assumption that there must always be a way for men to proceed
with sexual activity, no matter how little reliable information they have
about an adolescent's true age.
143 RR, supra note 84 at para 15.
144 See Lise Gotell, "Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault
Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women" (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 865 at 878
79, 882, 886, 891; Randall, "Ideal Victims" supra note 110 at 409, 414.
145 R v Pappajohn, [1980] 2 SCR 120 at para 155, 111 DLR (3d) 1, Dickson J,
dissenting; R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595 at para 73, 109 DLR (4th) 478.
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ADDENDUM
On March 15, 2019, after this paper was completed, the Supreme Court of
Canada released R v Morrison146, a decision about the offence of internet
luring of a child contrary to s. 172.1 of the Criminal Code. Morrison struck
down the evidentiary presumption requiring that, if a person represented
themselves to be under the relevant age of consent, the accused would
have to raise evidence to the contrary to show that he did not believe
the representation. Because luring is sometimes prosecuted on the basis
of a police sting operation, where there is no actual underage child, the
accused's belief about the person with whom he is corresponding is central
to these prosecutions. However, the majority went beyond this narrow
holding to consider the mistaken belief in age defence, and the reasonable
steps requirement as applied to the luring offences. Notably this defence
does not require "all reasonable steps" be taken, as is the case with other
sexual offences against children, but rather only "reasonable steps" to
ascertain the age of the person with whom the accused is corresponding.
A number of the findings in this case are relevant to the arguments
made in our article. The majority judgment can be read as undermining
the long-standing conception of the role of honest belief in sexual assault
as a defence of mistake that requires an air of reality before it goes to the
trier of fact. Instead, the majority holds that failure to comply with the
reasonable steps requirement does not necessarily lead to conviction,
contradicting its recent ruling in R v Gagnon, which holds that for sexual
assault, reasonable steps are part of the air of reality threshold.147 Justice
Moldaver states in Morrison: "[iun short, there is but one pathway to
conviction: proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed
the other person was underage. Nothing less will suffice."148 The majority
is not clear what role reasonable steps could ever play in this analysis
or when it would arise. If the Crown can prove subjective knowledge of
age, the accused will be convicted, and if the Crown cannot prove this
146 2019 SCC 15, 2019 CSC 15 [Morrison].
147 2018 SCC 41, 427 DLR (4th) 426. The majority in Morrison purports to
incorporate an air of reality threshold to the reasonable steps defence (paras 118 22) but
renders it meaningless where it says, at para 124, that where the Crown disproves reasonable
steps it is only the accused's ability to raise the defence that is affected: "This does not relieve
the Crown of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the
other person was underage"; and again (at para 126): "put simply, whether the accused is
convicted or put it does not hinge on whether the accused took reasonable steps: it hinges
on whether the Crown can prove the accused's belief beyond a reasonable doubt. The
presence or absence of reasonable steps is not essential for either conviction or acquittal".
148 Supra note 146 at para 83.
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knowledge, the analysis will not proceed to reasonable steps. In this way,
the reasonable steps requirement disappears.
A number of other findings in the case relate to arguments in this
paper. For example, we highlighted the difference between the reasonable
steps provision relating to mistaken belief in consent and the all reasonable
steps provision relating to mistaken belief in age, in that only the former
requires that the steps be assessed in the context of "the circumstances
known to the accused at the time" The majority in Morrison reads this
limiting phrase into s. 172.1(4) even though these words are left out of the
reasonable steps provisions dealing with age in the Criminal Code.149 The
majority makes much of the fact that the mistaken belief defence does not
contain the word "all" before reasonable steps and thus we would argue
that this part of the decision should be limited to the offence of internet
luring. Yet the majority also undermines its own decision in George,150 a
case about mistaken belief in age outside of the internet luring context.
The Court in George confirmed that failure to take all reasonable steps
could lead to conviction where the accused was asserting a mistaken belief.
In Morrison, by contrast, Moldaver J provides that if the trier of fact has a
reasonable doubt as to a mistaken belief in age, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, regardless of whether he or she has taken the required reasonable
steps: "[a]s a legal matter, to obtain a conviction for sexual interference
or sexual assault of a person under the age of 16, the Crown had to go
further and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the
complainant was under 16."151
The majority in Morrison goes out of its way to limit its judgment to the
context of internet luring where there is no actual underage child. 152 The
judgment of Justice Abella, dissenting on this issue, that would have struck
down the reasonable steps provision under s. 7 of the Charter, also limits
the constitutional analysis to the context of the internet luring provision. 153
Although the reasoning of both judgments is potentially much broader
than these cautions suggest, we hope this case will be interpreted in light
of these explicit statements about its intended limited scope.
149 Ibid at para 105.
150 Supra note 74.
151 Supra note 146 at para 88.
152 Ibid at paras 55, 84, 85,101.
153 Ibid at para 215.
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